Μηνιαίο Σεμινάριο Φιλοσοφίας ΚΕΕΦ 2025
Κύκλος Συναντήσεων – Πλάτωνος Πολιτεία Ε-Ζ
ΑΝΑΚΟΙΝΩΣΗ
Το Κέντρον Ερεύνης της Ελληνικής Φιλοσοφίας της Ακαδημίας Αθηνών
στο πλαίσιο του Μηνιαίου Σεμιναρίου Φιλοσοφίας
Σας προσκαλεί στην τελευταία συνάντηση του κύκλου σεμιναρίων
Πλάτωνος Πολιτεία Ε-Ζ
με ομιλητή τον Whitney Schwab, Καθηγητή Φιλοσοφίας
στο University of Maryland, Baltimore County
με θέμα: Epistêmê as a Form in Plato’s Republic.
Η συνάντηση θα πραγματοποιηθεί
την Τετάρτη 21 Ιανουαρίου 2026, 6-8 μμ (ώρα Ελλάδος).
Οι ενδιαφερόμενοι μπορούν να την παρακολουθήσουν
μόνο διαδικτυακά μέσω της εφαρμογής Zoom.
Οι διοργανωτές: Αλέξανδρος Νεχαμάς, Αθανάσιος Γκατζάρας, Ξανθίππη Μπουρλογιάννη
Πληροφορίες: xbourloyanni@gmail.com
Περίληψη
Epistêmê as a Form in Plato’s Republic
To defend his infamous claim that philosophers should rule, Socrates in the Republic argues that philosophers are best suited to rule because only philosophers possess epistêmê and epistêmê is necessary for good ruling. Over the course of Books 5–7, Socrates articulates a conception of epistêmê on which it is an incredibly demanding cognitive achievement, requiring someone to fasten on to the Form of the Good, which is “the principle of everything” (511b6) and “in some way the explanation of all things” (516c1–2). In this talk, I argue that Socrates in the Republic countenances a Form of Epistêmê. That is, just as he countenances a Form of Justice, a Form of Beauty, a Form of the Good, and so on, he countenances a Form of Epistêmê. Thus, we should take his discussion of epistêmê in Books 5–7 to be parallel to his discussion of, for example, justice in Books 2–4. So, just as he tells us that his discussion of justice aimed to produce a model (paradeigma) that can be put to various theoretical uses, we should take his discussion of epistêmê to aim to produce a model that can be put to various theoretical uses. And just as Socrates thinks that actual people are not unqualifiedly just (beautiful, good, etc.)) but, rather, participate in the Form of Justice and both are and are not just, he thinks that actual thinkers are not unqualifiedly epistêmôn but, rather, participate in the Form of Epistêmê and both are and are not epistêmôn. Once we recognize that Socrates countenances a Form of Epistêmê we can better understand his overall epistemology and make sense of potential oddities of his discussion, such as attributing epistêmê to people who he cannot think have fastened on to the Form of the Good.